This paper describes the synthesis of a protective operating system shell environment for robots. The approach is designed to protect the robot from the effects of errors in the lower level manipulator system and the higher level plan. This shell is composed of a number of fault tolerance tasks at a discrete decision making level. In order to separate the various functions of a robotic system and to better monitor the interactions of the components, we use models from the design of computer operating systems. The user communicates with a "shell" which is wrapped around a "kernel." One of the duties of the robot fault tolerance shell should be to enforce a protocol between the user commands and the robot fault tolerance capabilities. In the paper, we describe an implementation to conform to a formal protocol which explicitly includes fault tolerance. Each of the discrete layers in the robot control system will be modeled by a separate finite state machine (FSM). The FSMs encapsulate the redundancy and fault tolerance capabilities of the system in a uniform manner. Our FSMs wifi be designed to be dynamically growing and contracting as for example when new sensors are added or as sensors fall. From these FSMs we can develop a shell capability analysis utility that monitors the current fault tolerance status of the robot system. For example, the process of checking to see if the fault reconfigured robot can stifi complete its plan can be approached as a conformance testing problem. When faults cause joints to be lost, the reduced robot wifi be viewed as a subset of the original robot. Test sequences can be developed to determine if the reduced robot conforms to the original robot specification with respect to the user's original plan. A "critic" utifity in the shell can also check for obstacles and wifi halt the robot to protect it from possible damage.
Introduction
Currently there is a surge of interest in the area of fault tolerance for robotics. This activity has produced a series of potentially valuable methods. However, the work is somewhat piecemeal and application-specific, and systems engineers have been reluctant to adopt an apparently ad hoc collection of techniques without some theoretical justification of their systemwide effectiveness. The goal of this paper is to outline our work in developing the foundations for a rigorous approach to robotic fault tolerance.
The framework is composed of three parts: (1) formulation of inteffigent dynamic fault detection thresholds for a robot control system kernel; (2) synthesis of a protective operating system shell environment for robots; and (3) incorporation of the first two phases into a new theory of provably fault tolerant robotic systems.
The aim of part (1) is to predictably protect the robot from internal failures, while incorporating the inevitable sensing and modeling errors. Part (2) is designed to logically protect the robot from the effects of errors in the lower level manipulator system and the higher level plan. This shell is composed of a number of fault tolerance tasks at a discrete decision making level. A key goal of part (3) is to combine very different techniques for robotic fault tolerance into a provably correct overall fault tolerance system. The rigorous formulation in parts (1) and (2) wifi allow us to clearly define the problems and develop analytic solutions in part (3) .
Applications are legion, and extend to any domain where reliabifity (such as space robotics), or safety (for example medical robotics) are of particular importance. Robotics for nuclear environments is a prime example emphasizing both reliability and safety. We will primarily evaluate our results using this application, utifizing our ongoing experience with DOE's hazardous waste clean-up operations.
Background and Related Work
There is much ongoing interest in deployment of robots in remote and hazardous environments. Applications include hazardous waste management and clean-up9 and space-based operations.7 In these spheres of operation, the use of humans to perform tasks is limited to short periods of time, and the work is often dangerous as well as difficult.
The inherent problems in having humans perform tasks safely in these environments make robots an attractive, if not mandatory, alternative. The remoteness of such environments, the safety-critical tasks required, and the difficulty of repairing the robots after failure, make fault tolerance and reliability more critical issues than in conventional applications.'° However, safety is a concern with virtually all robotic applications. This is particularly true for the emerging area of medical robotics. New research that enables more reliable robots will be of benefit to the whole robotics community.
Recently, there has been a surge of interest in robot fault tolerance, and the subject has been investigated from a number of points of view. Ongoing work includes analysis of redundant systems,20'32'35'47 modular software environments,4'31'44 fault tolerant control environments,24'''36 error recovery,'1'26 and fault detection.'4'39'42 '48 In earlier work, we developed and verified algorithms which successfully detect and tolerate sensor and motor failures in a specific robot system.41 '42 To apply these algorithms to a wider variety of robots, we proposed an expert system based supervisor which performs robotic fault tolerance using a standardized representation of the robot's fault structure and modularized detection and recovery actions applicable to common robot components. Our software package is currently being evaluated at Sandia National Laboratories for DOE.
The advantage of this approach is that, through the Expert System, different methods for fault detection and tolerance, such as those referred to above, may be efficiently integrated, allowing the overall robot system to benefit from the best available approaches.
Fault detection is a critical link in the fault tolerance chain. For example, adding an extra sensor or actuator to a joint (providing a backup system) wifi be of no value in the event of a failure, if the fault detection routine cannot be reasonably guaranteed of detecting the fault in order to switch to the backup. There has been significant work in providing fault tolerance capabilities by redundancy of various sorts,5'32'35'47 but work in fault detection has lagged behind.
Improved fault detection methods can better protect the robot from subsystem (internal) failures. Another direction in which a rigorous strategy is needed is in protecting the robot from errors at the logical level. For example, inappropriate (i.e. faulty) signals can be passed to the robot from the operator and the planning software. Recent work45 has focused on protecting the robot from the effects of such errors at the servo level (reflex control), but it appears that there has been little formal work in formally analyzing and preventing these errors at an earlier (logical) stage in the control software.
However, it is still not enough to provide formal protection from internal and external failures independently. In many teleoperation applications, there is a general mistrust of adding new components and/or software to a robot system, even for fault tolerance. The feeling persists that rather than making the robot safer, the extra overhead will introduce new failure modes, making the system less reliable17! 2 Fault Detection: Adaptive Thresholds Fault detection is a critical component of any fault tolerant system.3° Without detection of a fault, the system wifi fail regardless of the amount of effort devoted to recovering from it. Disciplines such as reliability engineering, process control, and computer science have developed a wide variety of fault detection techniques.6'13"8'21'23" Fault detection has been a neglected area in robotics however, with relatively little literature or empirical work on the subject.14'39'43 '48 Development of methods to detect faults in dynamical sensor-based systems such as robots is hampered by the limitations and special characteristics of robots. Much previous research in surviving robot failures concentrates on providing fault tolerance by duplicating components32'47 or using kinematic redundancy. 26 Robotics can make use of any redundant component both in fault detection and fault tolerance, but the methods used for fault detection thus far have been fairly crude and empirical.
The most direct approach to detecting faults in a robotic system is to compare sensed readings with expected values (or alternative readings from redundant sensors). If the values differ, then the system is 'off-course' (or the sensors disagree). In the ideal world, a possible fault in the system can be inferred from the anomalous sensor readings.
In their pure form, such ideal tests for robotics wifi always cause false alarms due to the inevitable sensor noise, and more critically from linearization of the robot equations in the controller. Discrepancies also exist between the actual and modeled system parameters. An acceptable bound or threshold for the difference between the desired value and the sensor reading must be chosen22 to mask out these inaccuracies.
Typically, the thresholds have been determined empirically by monitoring a fault-free run and setting the threshold larger than the noted maximum deviation from the desired path. This method results in a constant threshold based on a specific trajectory. The effects of the modeling errors and sensor noise, however, fluctuate dynamically as the motion of the robot changes and as failures occur. For example, tasks involving complex high speed operations are more likely to violate the constant thresholds (and therefore need looser thresholds in normal operations) than simple slow speed motions. Thresholds which are unduly tight will produce many false alarms of faults, and loose thresholds may miss some failures.'8 Therefore, a verifiable dynamic method of varying the thresholds is a key to effective robot fault tolerance.
In recent work,413 we have developed an approach to fault detection for dynamical systems which utifizes the idea of finding the maximum sensor variance possible due to bounded parameter modeling errors at each reading in fault-free operation. This allows us to optimally determine dynamic thresholds throughout any trajectory. The dynamic thresholds significantly outperform empirically determined constant thresholds, eliminating false alarms and missed failures in the joints. With our new method, we found that only two time steps of history were needed for computing the thresholds for robot joint or sensor failures. This computational efficiency is essential for real-time robotic fault detection.
Protective Operating System Shell
In this section of the paper, we wifi focus on another critical and largely neglected failure path for robots, specifically the formal analysis of logical faults propagating between the robot and the user and planning software. This requires a logical model of the higher level components of the system. We wifi describe a robotic Protective Operating System Shell Environment (Robo-POSSE).
In order to separate the various functions of a robotic system and to better monitor the interactions of the components, we propose to use models from the design of computer operating systems. Operating system software25 allows for the scheduling and control of tasks desired by the user. The operating system presents a well-defined interface to the user and spares the user from having to know the particular details of the current configuration and underlying implementation. The user communicates with a "shell" which is wrapped around a "kernel." The shell understands that certain commands are potentially dangerous to the integrity of the system and are therefore privileged and can only be executed by the more knowledgeable "Super User." Computer operating systems provide various level of user privilege and enforce the concept of a "Super User" and a "Normal User." In a similar manner, operating systems provide a system of "signals" and "traps" for fault tolerance. For instance, in an early computer system, a floating-point division by zero would have corrupted a calculation and could have led to an erroneous result. It is now possible to create a trap handler that could deal more intelligently with the error by setting the result to a pre-defined value that the user code could interpret and take recovery actions. 8 We have performed some initial work in high level operating system architectures for robot fault tolerance.44 Figure 1 shows the high level interactions among the various layers of a fault tolerant intelligent control architecture. In Figure 1 , the user communicates commands to the protective Os shell which has knowledge of the current robot fault tolerance capabifities from the inteffigent robot kernel. Our previous work has concentrated on developing fault protection within the lower level robot kernel,41'42 which contains the servo and interface layers. The supervisory layer of the kernel is a discrete system which can be effectively modeled by finite state machines.44
One of the duties of the shell should be to enforce a protocol between the user commands and the robot fault tolerance capabilities. As part of this standardization, the user and operating system would agree on a language with a set of recognized commands. Recently, there has been some work at Sandia National Labs to develop a robot-independent programming language.3'4'12 In a language of this type, the commands could be further enhanced to result in a specific protocol or standard. The designers of a particular system could then develop an implementation to conform to the agreed upon protocol which explicitly includes fault tolerance. In our protective 05 shell environment, the shell wifi contain a fault 198 /SPIE Vol. 2589
Protective Operating System Shell tolerance capabifity analysis utility and a plan conformance and "critic" utility, as shown in Figure 1 .
A useful initial step in designing and verifying such a hybrid system is the development of a finite state machine (FSM) model. We have constructed a preliminary set of finite state machines for a multi-level fault tolerant system for robots in.44 Each of the discrete layers in Figure 1 is modeled by a separate finite state machine. For the purpose of analysis, the state machines may be combined through their respective input/output signals. The resulting finite state machine may then be viewed as a directed graph consisting of a vertex set and an edge set. A number of graph algorithms'6 may then be used to find particular paths through the graph which are useful in various testing algorithms.
The kernel Supervisory and Interface FSMs encapsulate the redundancy and fault tolerance capabifities of the system in a uniform manner. We can use this uniformity to analyze the available fault reconfiguration options. The fault detection algorithms described in Section 2 trigger a set of reconfiguration options in the FSMs. Our FSMs are designed to be dynamically growing and contracting as for example when new sensors are added or as sensors fail. From these FSMs we can develop a shell capability analysis utility that monitors the current fault tolerance status of the robot system. This wifi give an indication of joints that may be weakened or "sore" when for example one half of a dual drive motor has failed. This analysis can aid in determining the risks associated with following the current plan.
The issue of modular software for robotics is a important problem which is currently being successfully addressed3'4'31'44 through a number of robot control software systems. In general, protocols are useful in interconnecting modular systems. From our FSMs we can synthesize a protocol for interaction between the user plan and the robot kernel. We envision the protocol to be extensible to allow for the addition of optional modules. The existence of a protocol will help to more efficiently modularize the interfaces of these systems so that more extensive testing wifi improve their fault tolerance capabifities. The importance of protocols to connect disparate software systems in novel ways draws from the successful concepts developed years ago when impedance matching allowed for the cascading of electronic systems. 2 For example, the process of checking to see if the fault reconfigured robot can stifi complete its plan can be approached as a conformance testing problem."37 The original user plan is developed with a model of the robot which contains a specific number of sensors and joints. When faults cause joints to be lost, the reduced robot can be viewed as a subset of the original robot. Test sequences can be developed to determine if the reduced robot conforms to the original robot specification with respect to the user's original plan. The "critic" utifity in the shell can also check for obstacles and will halt the robot to protect it from possible damage. Only the super user can override the critic and force it to continue. The concept of a critic that will make judgments and recommendations to the user has been used in a number of automated systems. For example, systems exist for the analysis and criticism of text and VLSI circuit designs. 29 
Provable Fault Tolerant Strategies
The purpose of this part of the work is to provide a formal framework so that, given a technique, or a collection of techniques, proposed for robot fault tolerance, rigorous and quantifiable statements can be made about the fault tolerance of the overall system if the techniques are applied. This is an extremely complex and interesting issue. Clearly we will never be able to guarantee absolute fault tolerance for any system, for every possible failure scenario. The goal is to be able to prove that given a set of reasonable nominal assumptions about the system (from the designer or user), fault tolerance of the whole system can be guaranteed for a reasonably large class of anticipated failures.
If this critical step can be achieved, we can approach systems engineers using robotics for a specific application with a formal means of justifying quantitatively the usefulness of applying fault tolerance to various parts of a robotic system. Such a formal approach is lacking at present, and this is currently a barrier to the application of many of the algorithms being proposed for various aspects of robot fault tolerance.
As a first step, any strategy for adding fault tolerance must be shown to be at least as reliable as doing nothing. This seems obvious, but needs to be considered for practical fault tolerance. For example, consider adding a redundant actuator to a joint, as proposed in.32 '47 There is now a 'spare' to switch to in case of a sensor failure. lit the above techniques, each actuator takes part of the load in fault-free situations, and in the event of a failure, the surviving actuator takes over the full load while compensating for transients due to the failed joint. However, if the fault tolerant joint is not carefully integrated into the system, its use may introduce new failure modes, for example by overloading the power electronics. Clearly there is a need for formal verifications, or 'Theorems', to verify the overall effectiveness of proposed fault tolerance techniques.
Robots are a critical mix of continuous and discrete systems. To prove 'Theorems' for such hybrid systems, we wifi need to first prove 'Lemmas' for the subsystems. These 'Lemmas' may be either logical or continuous function based, depending on the (digital or analog) nature of the subsystem. To construct the overall 'Theorems' we wifi need to consider hybrid systems.'5 This is a fascinating but complex domain. A formal tool for analysis suitable for robotics is required.
The theory of Discrete-Event Dynamical Systems (DEDS)27 appears to be a promising basic logical structure for the dynamic evolution of fault tolerance for robots. DEDS model the evolution of an input-output-state system at the logical level.
The mathematical structure built up in the last decade (for a good summary, see27) for analysis and control of such systems provides a versatile toolbox for our use. This work has expressed basic automata and state machines38 in a structure corresponding to the blocks typical in feedback control. Many parallels between the analysis of the two types of system have been exploited,27 and a number of fundamental results for controllability and observabifity proved.'9'27'28 The techniques give a good set of rigorous analysis tools for considering discrete and continuous systems within the same framework.
We can exploit the above properties of DEDS in our work. The basic 'events' that drive the system are fundamental faults in the manipulator subsystems (detected encoder faults, etc.) and robot task or subtask event completions. The 'feedback states' in our application can be the initiation of fault tolerance methods at different parts of the robot system (switching from a faulty encoder to integrating tachometer measurements, etc.)
In this way, the 'open-loop' part of the DEDS is the robot status including faults, with the 'feedback' portion corresponding to the utilization of fault tolerance options built into the system. From this strategy, the DEDS can be synthesized so that controllability of the DEDS to a goal state corresponds to fault tolerance of the whole robot system. Formal definitions for controllability for DEDS are given in,27 which parallels that for more traditional continuous-time control theory.
In a similar fashion, observability has been formally defined for DEDS. In our strategy, observability of an appropriate DEDS could correspond to complete characterization of fault detection. Clearly, the power of any rigorous conclusions drawn from the structure of the DEDS depend on the verifiability of the fault detection methods. This point has been a key motivation for the formal methods for fault detection and checking in the first two phases of the research.
Finally, the DEDS could be used to prove (or disprove) the existence of a fault tolerant strategy for that class of failures of the manipulator. The uncontrollable subspace of the DEDS will help to identify 'weak' areas in the robot system from a fault tolerance point of view. Unobservable states wifi correspond to a lack of fault detection capability. We will use the structure provided by the DEDS to prove fault tolerance assertions given the assumptions on modeling and sampling inaccuracies, noise, etc., which will be modeled in the subsystems underlying the DEDS.
Application Focus: Hazardous Waste Robotics
To evaluate the results of our work in a practical setting, we wifi apply them to the analysis of an important robotic task in the DOE Waste Management program.9 Specifically, we wifi consider the deployment of a robot arm into underground storage tanks.
These tanks contain hazardous waste of various types, with differing (partially known) chemical composition and consistency. The task of the arm is to inspect the tank, and perform various operations (sluicing, removal, etc.) on the hazardous waste. Clearly the operation will be difficult and potentially dangerous. Fault tolerance of the arm is a high priority. For any specific failure scenario (for example a sensor failure or coffision of the robot with a wall), a fault tree analysis can be performed to identify the likely failure modes and possible fault tolerance actions for this failure. We have built up experience in fault tree analysis in robotics.4°T he expected initial manipulator for this task is the proposed Long Reach Manipulator (LRM). The LRM is to be deployed in underground storage tanks at the Hanford plant in Washington state. We anticipate that the manipulator will have structural redundancy (kinematic redundancy), and sensor redundancy (multiple sensors per joint) at a minimum. The arm is thus a prime candidate for the application of fault tolerance algorithms. In fact, the nature of the application demands this.
We will apply our results to various specific failure scenarios for the robot. In this effort, we will be guided by the work of engineers at Hanford as to which are their most critical failure situations. We expect these to include coffision with risers (vertical pipes) in the tank, and also hard contact with unforeseen obstacles. Sensor failures due to the harsh radioactive conditions in the tank wifi be evaluated.
SUMMARY
The protective operating system shell environment described in this paper is designed to protect robots from the effects of faults and errors. These errors could emanate from either the lower level robot system or the high-level plan. The user communicates with a "shell" , which is wrapped around a protective "kernel". The robot system is divided into layers, each modeled by a Finite State Machine. The overall environment offers considerable promise for rigorously integrating and analyzing various strategies for robot fault detection and fault tolerance.
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